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Geometric Convergence of Distributed Gradient Play in Games with
Unconstrained Action Sets
Tatiana Tatarenko and Angelia Nedic´
Abstract—We provide a distributed algorithm to learn a
Nash equilibrium in a class of non-cooperative games with
strongly monotone mappings and unconstrained action sets.
Each player has access to her own smooth local cost function
and can communicate to her neighbors in some undirected
graph. We consider a distributed communication-based gradi-
ent algorithm. For this procedure, we prove geometric con-
vergence to a Nash equilibrium. In contrast to our previous
works [15], [16], where the proposed algorithms required two
parameters to be set up and the analysis was based on a
so called augmented game mapping, the procedure in this
work corresponds to a standard distributed gradient play
and, thus, only one constant step size parameter needs to be
chosen appropriately to guarantee fast convergence to a game
solution. Moreover, we provide a rigorous comparison between
the convergence rate of the proposed distributed gradient play
and the rate of the GRANE algorithm presented in [15]. It
allows us to demonstrate that the distributed gradient play
outperforms the GRANE in terms of convergence speed.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are a lot of multi-agent systems, where agents’
objective functions are coupled through decision variables of
all agents in a system. In such cases, game theory is a useful
tool to deal with the corresponding optimization problems.
The applications of game theory in engineering can be
found, for example, in electricity markets, power systems,
flow control problems, and communication networks [1], [9],
[12]. Desirable outcomes in games are characterized by so
called Nash equilibria, which correspond to a stable state
from which no agent has motivation to deviate. This paper
provides a distributed discrete-time algorithm applicable to
fast Nash equilibrium seeking in a class of non-cooperative
games under the assumption that agents exchange their local
information with neighbors by means of some communica-
tion topology.
Distributed communication-based algorithms are proposed
for aggregative games [3], [6]. Communication protocols are
applied to different classes of games with some convergence
guarantees [10], [11], [14]. The work [10] proposes a gradi-
ent based gossip algorithm to learn Nash equilibria in games.
Under some technical assumptions, this algorithm converges
almost surely to the Nash equilibrium, given a diminishing
step size. Under further assumption of strong convexity, with
some constant step size α, the algorithm converges to an
O(α) neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium in average.
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The work [11] develops an algorithm within the framework
of inexact-ADMM and proves its convergence to the Nash
equilibrium with the rate o(1/k) under cocoercivity of the
game mapping. However, no aforementioned work aims to
provide algorithms which converge to a Nash equilibrium
with a fast geometric rate.
The paper [16] leverages the idea of an accelerated ap-
proach for solving variational inequalities [4] and provides
a version of the gradient play algorithm (Acc-GRANE) that
guaratees a fast convergence to the Nash equilibrium with
an explicitly good dependence on the condition number. The
analysis is based on strong monotone properties of a so called
augmented mapping which takes into account not only the
gradients of the cost functions, but also the communication
settings. The presented algorithm is applicable only to a
sub-class of games characterized by a restrictive connection
between the number of players, Lipschitz constant, and
parameter of strong monotonicity. To apply the distributed
gradient play algorithm to a broader class of games, work
[15] considers the case of the restricted strongly monotone
augmented game mapping and demonstrates geometric con-
vergence of the procedure to the Nash equilibrium. However,
both types of the procedures mentioned above require a
careful set up not only for the step size parameter but also
for the augmented mapping. In this paper we provide a
distributed gradient play whose convergence properties are
not based on the augmented mapping. This fact allows us to
focus only on the choice of the step size in the optimization
procedure. Moreover, a rigorous comparison between the
convergence rates of the proposed distributed gradient play
and the GRANE in [15] demonstrates that the algorithm
presented in this paper converges faster to a Nash equilibrium
under the same settings of a game.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we set
up the game under consideration. In Section III, we present
the distributed gradient play algorithm to seek its solutions.
In Section IV, we prove the main result stating a geometric
convergence of the proposed procedure. Section V compares
the convergence rates of the proposed algorithm and the
GRANE from work [15]. We provide a numerical case study
in Section VI. In Section VII, we summarize the result and
discuss future work.
Notations. The set {1, . . . , n} is denoted by [n]. For any
function f : K → R, K ⊆ Rn, ∇if(x) = ∂f(x)∂xi is the
partial derivative taken in respect to the ith coordinate of the
vector variable x ∈ Rn. For any real vector space E˜ its dual
space is denoted by E˜∗ and the inner product is denoted by
〈u, v〉, u ∈ E˜∗, v ∈ E˜. An operator B : E˜ → E˜∗ is positive
definite if 〈Bv, v〉 > 0 for all v ∈ E˜ \ {0}. An operator
B : E˜ → E˜∗ is self-adjoint if 〈Bv, v′〉 = 〈Bv′, v〉 for all
v′, v ∈ E˜. Given a positive definite and self-adjoint operator
B, we define the Euclidean norm on E˜ induced by B as
‖v‖= 〈Bv, v〉1/2. Any mapping g : E˜ → E˜∗ is said to be
strongly monotone with the constant µ > 0 on Q ⊆ E˜, if
〈g(u)− g(v), u − v〉 ≥ µ‖u− v‖2 for any u, v ∈ Q, where
‖·‖ is the corresponding norm in E˜. We consider real vector
space E, which is either space of real vectors E = E∗ = Rn
or the space of real matrices E = E∗ = Rn×n. In the case
E = Rn×n the inner product 〈u, v〉 , √trace(uT v) is the
Frobenius inner product on Rn×n. In the case E = Rn
we use ‖·‖ to denote the Euclidean norm induced by the
standard dot product in Rn, whereas in the case E = Rn×n
we use ‖·‖Fro to denote the Frobenius norm induced by
the Frobenius inner product i.e. ‖v‖Fro,
√
trace(vT v). The
largest singular value of a matrix A is denoted by σmax{A}.
The smallest nonzero eigenvalue of a positive semidefinite
matrix A 6= 0 is denoted by λ˜min{A}, which is strictly
positive. For any matrix A ∈ Rn×n we use diag(A) to denote
its diagonal vector, i.e. diag(A) = (a11, . . . , ann). For any
vector a ∈ Rn we use Diag(a) to denote the diagonal
matrix with the vector a on its diagonal. We call a matrix A
consensual, if it has equal row vectors.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a non-cooperative game between n players
with unconstrained action sets. Let Ji and Ωi = R denote
respectively the cost function and the feasible action set of
the player i1. Each function Ji(xi, x−i), i ∈ [n], depends on
xi and x−i, where xi ∈ R is the action of the player i and
x−i ∈ Ω−i = Rn−1 denotes the joint action of all players
except for the player i. Overall in this paper, we assume that
the cost function Ji(xi, x−i) is continuously differentiable
in xi for each fixed x−i, i ∈ [n]. Then we define the game
mapping as
F(x) , [∇1J1(x1, x−1), . . . ,∇nJn(xn, x−n)]T , (1)
where ∇iJi(xi, x−i) = ∂Ji(xi,x−i)∂xi for all i ∈ [n]. We
assume that the players can interact over an undirected
communication graph G([n],A). The set of nodes is the
set of the player [n] and the set of undirected arcs A is
such that (i, j) ∈ A if and only if (j, i) ∈ A, i.e. there
is an undirected communication link between i to j. Thus,
some information (message) can be passed from the player
i to the player j and vice versa. For each player i the set
Ni is the set of neighbors in the graph G([n],A), namely
Ni , {j ∈ [n] : (i, j) ∈ A}. Let us denote the game
introduced above by Γ(n, {Ji}, {Ωi = R},G). We make the
following assumptions regarding the game Γ.
Assumption 1. The game mapping F(x) is strongly mono-
tone on Rn with the constant µ > 0.
1All results below are applicable for games with different dimensions
{di} of the action sets, i.e., Ωi = Rdi for all i. The one-dimensional case
is considered for the sake of notation simplicity.
Note that Assumption 1 above implies strong convexity of
each cost function Ji(xi, x−i) in xi for any fixed x−i with
the constant µ.
Assumption 2. Each function ∇iJi(·) : Rn → R, i ∈ [n],
is Lipschitz continuous on Rn, namely for some constant
Li ≥ 0, we have ∀ x, y ∈ Rn
|∇iJi(x) −∇iJi(y)| ≤ Li‖x− y‖.
Remark 1. An example of games satisfying Assumption 2
above is a class of aggregative games [3], [6], where each
cost function Ji is of the following form:
Ji(xi, x−i) = ci(xi)− xiUi(
n∑
j=1
xj).
Here ci(·) : R → R is an agent specific function with
a Lipschitz continuous derivative and the linear function
Ui(
∑n
j=1 xj) captures the utility associated with aggregate
output
∑n
j=1 xj .
Two assumptions above are standard for works aiming
to demonstrate geometric convergence of algorithms for
computing an equilibrium point in variational inequalities
and games.
Finally, we make the following assumption on the com-
munication graph, which guarantees sufficient information
”mixing” in the network.
Assumption 3. The underlying undirected communication
graph G([n],A) is connected. There is a non-negative matrix
W = [wij ] ∈ Rn×n associated with the graph such that
wij > 0 if and only if (i, j) ∈ A. Moreover, W is doubly
stochastic, i.e.
∑n
l=1 wlj =
∑n
l=1 wil = 1, ∀i, j ∈ [n].
Remark 2. The weight matrix W from Assumption 3 need
not be symmetric. Some simple strategies that generate
symmetric mixing matrices for which Assumption 3 holds
can be found in Section 2.4 in [13].
Assumption 3 implies that the second largest singular
value σ of W is such that σ ∈ (0, 1) and for any x ∈ Rn
the following average property holds (see [5]):
‖Wx− 1x¯‖≤ σ‖x− 1x¯‖, (2)
where x¯ = 1n1
Tx is the average of the coordinates of x.
One of the stable solutions in any game Γ corresponds to
a Nash equilibrium defined below.
Definition 1. A vector x∗ = [x∗1, x
∗
2, · · · , x∗n]T ∈ Ω is a Nash
equilibrium if for any i ∈ [n] and xi ∈ Ωi
Ji(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Ji(xi, x∗−i).
In this work, we are interested in distributed seeking of
a Nash equilibrum in a game Γ(n, {Ji}, {Ωi = R},G) for
which Assumptions 1-3 hold. Note that under Assumption 1,
the game Γ(n, {Ji}, {Ωi = R},G) has a unique Nash
equilibrium [8]. Moreover, as Ωi = R and Ji(xi, x−i) is
strongly monotone in xi over R for all i ∈ [n] the vector
x∗ ∈ Rn is the unique Nash equilibrium if and only if
F(x∗) = 0. (3)
III. NASH EQUILIBRIA LEARNING IN DISTRIBUTED
SETTINGS
To deal with the partial information available to players
which is exchanged among them over the communication
graph, we assume that each player i maintains a local
variable
x(i) = [x˜(i)1, · · · , x˜(i)i−1, xi, x˜(i)i+1, · · · , x˜(i)n]T ∈ Rn,
(4)
which is her estimation of the joint action x =
[x1, x2, · · · , xn]T . Here x˜(i)j ∈ R is the player i’s estimate
of xj and x˜(i)i = xi ∈ Ωi = R. Also, we compactly denote
the estimates of other players’ actions by the player i as
x˜−i = [x˜(i)1, · · · , x˜(i)i−1, x˜(i)i+1, · · · , x˜(i)n]T ∈ Rn−1, (5)
and the estimates of the player j’s action xj by all players
as
x˜(:)j = [x˜(1)j , · · · , x˜(j−1)j , xj , x˜(j+1)j , · · · , x˜(n)j ]T ∈ Rn.
Thus, we can define the estimation matrix x ∈ Rn×n, where
the ith row is equal to the estimation vector x(i), i ∈ [n],
namely
x ,


— xT(1) —
— xT(2) —
...
— xT(n) —

 .
For any given estimation matrix, we define the diagonal
matrix F˜(x) ∈ Rn×n with F˜(x)ii = ∇iJi(x(i)), i ∈ [n],
namely
F˜(x) , Diag(∇1J1(x(1)), . . . ,∇nJn(x(n))). (6)
We propose the following distributed gradient play pro-
cedure for learning a Nash equilibrium in the game
Γ(n, {Ji}, {Ωi = R},G). According to this algorithm, each
player i updates its local estimation of the joint action as
follows:
xt+1i =
n∑
j=1
wijx
t
(j)i − α∇xiJi(xt(i)),
xt+1(i)l =
n∑
j=1
wijx
t
(j)l, for l 6= i, i ∈ [n].
Thus, to get a new estimation xt+1(i) each agent i aggregates
over the communication graph the current estimations of its
neighbors and, makes a local gradient step with a step size
α in respect to the gradient of its cost function ∇xiJi(xt(i))
calculated at the current local estimation xt(i). The local
updates above can be represented in the following compact
vector form:
xt+1 = Wxt − αF˜(xt), (7)
where α is a constant step size to be set up.
In the following we prove geometric convergence of the
procedure above to the unique Nash equilibrium in the game
Γ(n, {Ji}, {Ωi = R},G) under Assumptions 1-3 and an
appropriate choice of α. This result is formulated in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let Γ(n, {Ji}, {Ωi = R},G) be a game for
which Assumptions 1-3 hold. Let µ and σ be as defined in
Assumption 1 and relation (2), respectively, and the step size
parameter α be chosen as follows:
0 < α < min
{
1,
µ
2L2
,
σ
2L
√
n√
n− 1
( √
2√
1 + σ2
− 1
)
,
n
µ
(
8
(
√
1 + σ2 −√2)2 − 1
)
,√
n2 + 2µ
4(1−σ2)
(n−1)L4(1+σ2) − n
2µ

 ,
where L is the Lipschitz constant defined in Assumption 2.
Then, the algorithm (7) converges to the consensual matrix
x∗ whose rows are equal to the row-vector x∗ which is
the unique Nash equilibrium in the game Γ(n, {Ji}, {Ωi =
R},G). Moreover,
‖xt − x∗‖2Fro≤ O(qt)
for some q = q(α) ∈ (0, 1).
In the next section we provide the proof of the main result
formulated in Theorem 1 above.
IV. PROOF OF MAIN RESULT
Let x¯t be a consensual matrix with the rows equal to the
vector x¯t = 1n
∑n
i=1 x
t
(i). This matrix corresponds to the
running average of the players’ estimations of the current
joint action. Under Assumption 3, as seen from the definition
of the algorithm in (7), the average x¯t evolves according to
the following relation:
x¯t+1 = x¯t − α
n
F0(xt), (8)
where F0(·) is the consensual matrix with the rows equal to
diag(F˜(·)).
To prove Theorem 1, we start by proving some lemmata.
First of all, we estimate the consensus violation term in
respect to the running average, namely ‖xt+1 − x¯t+1‖Fro.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 3 the following holds for the
procedure (7):
‖xt+1 − x¯t+1‖Fro≤ σ‖xt − x¯t‖Fro+α
√
n− 1√
n
‖F˜(xt)‖Fro.
Proof. Taking into account (2) and (8), we conclude that
‖xt+1 − x¯t+1‖Fro
= ‖Wxt − αF˜(xt)− x¯t + α
n
F0(xt)‖Fro
≤ σ‖xt − x¯t‖Fro+α
n
‖nF˜(xt)− F0(xt)‖Fro.
Next, note that
nF˜(xt)− F0(xt)
=


(n− 1)∇1J1(xt(1)) . . . −∇nJn(xt(n))
−∇1J1(xt(1)) . . . −∇nJn(xt(n))
...
. . .
...
−∇1J1(xt(1)) . . . −(n− 1)∇nJn(xt(n))


and, hence,
‖nF˜(xt)− F0(xt)‖Fro =
√√√√n(n− 1) n∑
i=1
(∇iJi(xt(i)))2
=
√
n(n− 1)‖F˜(xt)‖Fro,
thus yielding the stated result.
Next, to estimate the distance ‖xt+1−x¯t+1‖Fro in terms of
optimum violation ‖xt−x∗‖Fro, we upper bound ‖F˜(xt)‖Fro
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let Assumption 2 hold in the game
Γ(n, {Ji}, {Ωi = R},G). Then
‖F˜(xt)‖Fro≤ L‖xt − x∗‖Fro,
where L = maxi Li and Li, i ∈ [n], are the Lipschitz
constants from Assumption 2.
Proof. Due to Assumption 2 and the fact that F(x∗) = 0
(see (3)),
‖F˜(xt)‖Fro = ‖F˜(xt)− F˜(x∗)‖Fro
=
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(∇iJi(xt(i))−∇iJi(x∗))2
=
√√√√ n∑
i=1
L2i ‖xt(i) − x∗‖2 ≤ L
√√√√ n∑
i=1
‖xt(i) − x∗‖2
= L‖xt − x∗‖Fro.
Finally, we analyze the distance between the running
average and the Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3. Let Assumptions 1-3 hold in the game
Γ(n, {Ji}, {Ωi = R},G). Then for any θ > 0 and the step
size α ≤ θL2 the following inequality holds:(
1 +
2α
n
(
µ− θ
2
))
‖x¯t+1 − x∗‖2Fro
≤ ‖x¯t − x∗‖2Fro+
L2α
θ
‖xt − x¯t‖2Fro.
Proof. Let Fˆ(xt) = (∇1J1(xt(1)), . . . ,∇nJn(xt(n)))T ∈ Rn.
Using the equality x¯t+1 = x¯t − αn Fˆ(xt) (see (8)) and the
basic inequality ‖a‖2= ‖a + b‖2−2〈a, b〉 − ‖b‖2 for a =
x¯t+1 − x∗ and b = x¯t − x¯t+1, we obtain
‖x¯t+1 − x∗‖2 = ‖x¯t − x∗‖2−2〈x¯t+1 − x∗, x¯t − x¯t+1〉
− ‖x¯t − x¯t+1‖2
= ‖x¯t − x∗‖2−2α
n
〈x¯t+1 − x∗, Fˆ(xt)〉
− ‖x¯t − x¯t+1‖2. (9)
We proceed with estimating the term 〈x¯t+1 − x∗, Fˆ(xt)〉.
〈x¯t+1 − x∗, Fˆ(xt)〉 = 〈Fˆ(xt)− F(x¯t+1), x¯t+1 − x∗〉
+ 〈F(x¯t+1)− F(x∗), x¯t+1 − x∗〉
≥ 〈Fˆ(xt)− F(x¯t+1), x¯t+1 − x∗〉
+ µ‖x¯t+1 − x∗‖2, (10)
where in the first equality we used the fact that F(x∗) = 0
(see (3)) and in the last inequality we used Assumption 1.
Next, for any θ > 0 we obtain
〈Fˆ(xt)− F(x¯t+1), x¯t+1 − x∗〉 ≥ −θ
2
‖x¯t+1 − x∗‖2
− 1
2θ
‖Fˆ(xt)− F(x¯t+1)‖2
= −θ
2
‖x¯t+1 − x∗‖2− 1
2θ
n∑
i=1
‖∇iJi(xt(i))−∇iJi(x¯t+1)‖2
≥ −θ
2
‖x¯t+1 − x∗‖2−L
2
2θ
n∑
i=1
‖xt(i) − x¯t+1‖2. (11)
Bringing (10) and (11) into (9) we conclude that
‖x¯t+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ ‖x¯t − x∗‖2−2α
n
(
µ− θ
2
)
‖x¯t+1 − x∗‖2
+
αL2
nθ
n∑
i=1
‖xt(i) − x¯t+1‖2−‖x¯t − x¯t+1‖2.
Further, taking into account that
∑n
i=1‖xt(i) − x¯t+1‖2=∑n
i=1‖xt(i) − x¯t‖2+n‖x¯t − x¯t+1‖2, we see that
‖x¯t+1 − x∗‖2≤ ‖x¯t − x∗‖2−2α
n
(
µ− θ
2
)
‖x¯t+1 − x∗‖2
+
αL2
nθ
n∑
i=1
‖xt(i) − x¯t‖2+(
αL2
θ
− 1)‖x¯t − x¯t+1‖2.
(12)
Next, taking into that α < θL2 ,
∑n
i=1‖xt(i) − x¯t‖2= ‖xt −
x¯t‖2Fro, and that for any consensual matrices x ∈ Rn×n, y ∈
Rn×n with the vectors x, y ∈ Rn as their rows respectively
we have ‖x− y‖2= 1n‖x− y‖2Fro, we get from (12)(
1 +
2α
n
(
µ− θ
2
))
‖x¯t+1 − x∗‖2Fro
≤ ‖x¯t − x∗‖2Fro+
L2α
θ
‖xt − x¯t‖2Fro.
Having these three lemmata in place, we are ready to prove
the main result.
Proof of Theorem 1. Taking into account Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2, we conclude that, under conditions of the theorem,
we have
‖xt+1 − x¯t+1‖Fro ≤ σ‖xt − x¯t‖Fro+α
√
n− 1√
n
‖F˜(xt)‖Fro,
‖F˜(xt)‖Fro ≤ L‖xt − x∗‖Fro.
The inequalities above together with
‖xt − x∗‖Fro≤ ‖xt − x¯t‖Fro+‖x¯t − x∗‖Fro
imply that
‖xt+1 − x¯t+1‖Fro ≤ σ‖xt − x¯t‖Fro
+ α
√
n− 1√
n
L‖xt − x∗‖Fro
≤ (σ + α
√
n− 1√
n
L)‖xt − x¯t‖Fro
+ α
√
n− 1√
n
L‖x¯t − x∗‖Fro. (13)
Next, we apply to (13) the standard inequality (a + b)2 ≤
(1+β)a2+ 1+ββ b
2, which holds for any real numbers a, b ∈ R
and any β > 0. By taking a = (σ + α
√
n−1√
n
L)‖xt − x¯t‖Fro
and b = α
√
n−1√
n
L‖x¯t − x∗‖Fro, we get
‖xt+1 − x¯t+1‖2Fro ≤ ((σ + α
√
n− 1√
n
L)‖xt − x¯t‖Fro
+ α
√
n− 1√
n
L‖x¯t − x∗‖Fro)2
≤ (1 + β)(σ + α
√
n− 1√
n
L)2‖xt − x¯t‖2Fro
+
1 + β
β
α2
n− 1
n
L2‖x¯t − x∗‖2Fro. (14)
Moreover, Lemma 3 with the choice θ = µ implies
‖x¯t+1 − x∗‖2Fro≤ γ‖x¯t − x∗‖2Fro+γ
2L2α
µ
‖xt − x¯t‖2Fro,
(15)
where γ = 11+µα
n
. Let zt = (‖x¯t − x∗‖2Fro, ‖xt − x¯t‖2Fro).
Then taking (14) and (15) into account, we conclude that
zt+1 ≤ Z(α, µ, β)zt, (16)
where
Z =
(
γ γ 2L
2α
µ
1+β
β
n−1
n α
2L2 (1 + β)(σ + α
√
n−1√
n
L)2
)
.
We proceed with analysis of the properties of the positive
matrix Z = Z(α, µ, β). First, we calculate its eigenvalues.
Its characteristic polynomial is
pZ(λ) = (λ− γ)
(
λ− (1 + β)(σ + α
√
n− 1√
n
L)2
)
− γ n− 1
n
2α3
µ
1 + β
β
L4.
We need to solve pZ(λ) = 0, namely
λ2 − (γ + (1 + β)(σ + α
√
n− 1√
n
L)2)λ
+ γ(1 + β)(σ + α
√
n− 1√
n
L)2
− γ n− 1
n
2α3
µ
1 + β
β
L4 = 0.
This results in
λ1,2 =
γ + (1 + β)(σ + α
√
n−1√
n
L)2 ±√D
2
,
where
D = (γ + (1 + β)(σ + α
√
n− 1√
n
L)2)2
− 4
[
γ(1 + β)(σ + α
√
n− 1√
n
L)2 − γ n− 1
n
2α3
µ
1 + β
β
L4
]
= (γ − (1 + β)(σ + α
√
n− 1√
n
L)2)2
+ 8γ
n− 1
n
α3
µ
1 + β
β
L4. (17)
We let λ1 denote the largest (positive) eigenvalue. Borrowing
the idea from the proof of Lemma 7 and Lemma 17 in [7],
we notice that, due to properties of the diagonalization, any
element of the matrix Zt is in the form zijt = zt = c1λ
t
1 +
c2λ
t
2, i, j = 1, 2, for some c1, c2 ∈ C (we omit the element
upper index in zijt to simplify notations). To estimate c1, c2
for each element, we construct the following system of linear
equalities: {
c1 + c2 = z0,
c1λ1 + c2λ2 = z1,
where z0 and z1 are the corresponding elements of the
matrices Z0 and Z respectively. The solution of the system
above is
c1 =
z1 − z0λ2
λ1 − λ2 ,
c2 =
z0λ1 − z1
λ1 − λ2 . (18)
Thus,
zt =
z1λ
t
1 − z0λ2λt1
λ1 − λ2 +
z0λ1λ
t
2 − z1λt2
λ1 − λ2
=
z1(λ
t
1 − λt2)− z0λ2λ1(λt−11 − λt−12 )
λ1 − λ2
≤ z1(λ
t
1 − λt2)
λ1 − λ2 ≤ 2z1
λt1
λ1 − λ2 , (19)
where in the last two inequalities we used Perron-Frobenius
Theorem for positive matrices, namely λ1 > |λ2| (see
Theorem 8.2.11 in [2]). As
‖xt+1 − x∗‖2Fro≤ 2‖x¯t+1 − x∗‖2Fro+2‖xt+1 − x¯t+1‖2Fro,
and by taking into account (16) and (19), we conclude that
‖xt+1 − x∗‖2Fro ≤ 2z11t ‖x¯0 − x∗‖2Fro+2z12t ‖x0 − x¯0‖2Fro
+ 2z21t ‖x¯0 − x∗‖2Fro+2z22t ‖x0 − x¯0‖2Fro
≤ λt1
4
λ1 − λ2 [(z
11
1 + z
21
1 )‖x¯0 − x∗‖2Fro
+ (z121 + z
22
1 )‖x0 − x¯0‖2Fro].
(20)
In (20) zij1 is the ijth element of the matrix Z
1 = Z . Thus,
to get the result it suffices to demonstrate that λ1 < 1. Recall
that
λ1 =
γ + (1 + β)(σ +
√
n−1√
n
αL)2 +
√
D
2
, (21)
where
D = (γ − (1 + β)(σ + α
√
n− 1√
n
L)2)2
+ 8γ
n− 1
n
α3
µ
1 + β
β
L4.
Let us now fix β = 12
(
1
σ2 − 1
)
. As
α <
σ
2L
√
n√
n− 1
( √
2√
1 + σ2
− 1
)
=
1
2L
√
n√
n− 1
(
1√
1 + β
− σ
)
,
we conclude that
(1 + β)(σ + α
√
n− 1√
n
L)2
< (1 + β)
(
σ +
1
2
(
1√
1 + β
− σ
))2
=
1
4
(σ
√
1 + β − 1)2. (22)
As α < nµ
(
8
(
√
1+σ2−√2)2 − 1
)
= nµ
(
4
(σ
√
1+β−1)2 − 1
)
, we
conclude that
γ =
1(
1 + µαn
) ≥ 1
4
(σ
√
1 + β − 1)2. (23)
Bringing (22) and (23) together, we obtain
(1 + β)(σ + α
√
n− 1√
n
L)2 < γ
and, thus, from (21)
λ1 < γ +
√
γ
2α3
µ
1 + β
β
n− 1
n
L4
=
n
n+ µα
+
√
n− 1
n+ µα
2α3
µ
1 + σ2
1− σ2L
4. (24)
Next, taking into account that α <
√
n2+ 2µ
4(1−σ2)
(n−1)L4(1+σ2)
−n
2µ and
(24), we conclude that2
λ1 < 1.
2More details can be found in Appendix.
Finally, according to (20),
‖xt+1 − x∗‖2Fro≤ O(qt),
where
q(α) = λ1 =
n
2(n+ µα)
+
(1 + σ2)(σ + α
√
n−1√
n
L)2
4σ2
+
√
D
2
,
(25)
where
D =
(
n
n+ µα
− 1
2
(1 +
1
σ2
)(σ + α
√
n− 1√
n
L)2
)2
+ 8
n− 1
n+ µα
α3
µ
1 + σ2
1− σ2L
4.
V. COMPARISON WITH THE CONVERGENCE RATE OF THE
GRANE
In this section we compare the convergence rate of the
algorithm (7) analyzed in this paper and the convergence
rate of the GRANE procedure studied in [15], given some
large number of players n.
According to Theorem 9 in [15] under Assumptions 1-3
made above, the GRANE converges to the Nash equilibrium
with the rate O
((
1− 1γ2r
)t)
, where γr =
LFa
µr,Fa
> 1
and the constants LFa , µr,Fa are defined in Lemmas 1
and 3 respectively3. After substituting the expressions for
LFa , µr,Fa into γr, we conclude that for a sufficiently large n
γr = 2n
[
L
µ
+
σmax{I −W}
α0µ
]
.
Next, according to Remark 4 in [15],
α0 <
λ˜min{I −W}
L
(
1 + 1β2
) , where β ∼ µnL .
Thus, given the optimal choice of α0, we get
γr = 2n

L
µ
+
L/µ
(
1 + n
2L2
µ2
)
σmax{I −W}
λ˜min{I −W}

 .
Thus, the convergence rate of the GRANE is
O
((
1− µ
6
L6n6
)t)
. (26)
Now we proceed with the convergence rate estimation of
the algorithm (7). According to the proof of Theorem 1, the
3The constant LF = maxi{
√
L2
i
+ L2
−i
} defined in Lemma 3 in [15]
corresponds to the constant L = maxi Li, where Lis are defined in
Assumption 2 in this paper.
convergence rate of the distributed procedure is O(q(α)t),
where (see (24))
q(α) <
n
n+ µα
+
√
n− 1
n+ µα
2α3
µ
1 + σ2
1− σ2L
4.
The constant q above is less than 1, if
α <
√
n2 + 2µ
4(1−σ2)
(n−1)L4(1+σ2) − n
2µ
=
n
2µ
(
1 +
2µ4(1 − σ2)
(n− 1)n2L4(1 + σ2)
)1/2
− n
2µ
∼ µ
3(1 − σ2)
2n(n− 1)L4(1 + σ2) .
Thus, taking into account two inequalities above, we con-
clude that for a sufficiently large n
q(α ∼ µ
3(1− σ2)
2n(n− 1)L4(1 + σ2) ) < O
(
n
n+ µα
)
= O
(
(1 +
µα
n
)−1
)
= O
(
1− µα
n
)
= O
(
1− µ
4
L4n2(n− 1)
)
. (27)
Next, let us notice that, under Assumption 2, the game
mapping F defined in (1) is Lipschitz continuous with the
constant LF = L
√
n. Indeed, due to Assumption 2,
‖F(x)− F(y)‖2 =
n∑
i=1
(∇iJi(x) −∇iJi(y))2
≤
n∑
i=1
L2i ‖x− y‖2≤ nL2‖x− y‖2.
Thus, the condition number of the mapping F is
LF
µ
=
L
√
n
µ
≥ 1. (28)
By comparing (26) and (27) and taking into account
(28), we conclude that the convergence rate of the proposed
algorithm (7) is faster than that of the GRANE presented in
[15].
VI. SIMULATION
Let us consider a class of games with strongly monotone
game mappings. Specifically, we have players {1, 2, . . . , 20}
and each player i’s objective is to minimize the cost function
Ji(xi, x−i) = fi(xi)+ li(x−i)xi, where fi(xi) = 0.5aix2i +
bixi and li(x−i) =
∑
j 6=i cijxj . The local cost function
is in general dependent on actions of all players, but the
underlying communication graph is a randomly generated
tree graph. We randomly select ai, bi, and cij for all possible
i and j.
We simulate the proposed gradient play algorithm and
compare its implementation with the implementation of the
algorithm GRANE presented in [15] (see Figure 1). The
GRANE is based on a so called augmented game mapping,
for which an additional parameter has to be chosen to guaran-
tee specific properties of this mapping and, thus, convergence
of the procedure. Note that the GRANE is very sensitive to
the setting of this parameter. We chose this parameter based
on the theoretic results in [15]. For the gradient play we
chose the step size parameter α based on Theorem 1 (in the
presented simulation α = 0.05). As we can see, the gradient
play outperforms the GRANE.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of the presented algorithm and GRANE based on
restricted strongly monotone augmented mapping
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented the distributed gradient
play which provably converges to a Nash equilibrium in
strongly convex games with unconstrained action sets. In
comparison to the GRANE algorithm [15], which possesses
a geometric convergence rate as well, the proposed algorithm
requires only one parameter (the step size) to be appropri-
ately choose. Moreover, its convergence rate is shown to be
faster given some fixed game under consideration. The future
work can be devoted to investigation of the convergence rate
of the gradient projected play in the case of bounded closed
agents’ action sets.
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Appendix
Here we demonstrate that nn+µα+
√
n−1
n+µα
2α3
µ
1+σ2
1−σ2L
4 < 1
(see (24)) if 0 < α <
√
n2+
2µ4(1−σ2)
(n−1)L4(1+σ2)
−n
2µ .
Indeed,
n
n+ µα
+
√
n− 1
n+ µα
2α3
µ
1 + σ2
1− σ2L
4 < 1
m√
(n− 1)2α
µ3
1 + σ2
1− σ2L
4 <
1√
n+ µα
m
αc(n+ µα)− 1 = cµα2 + ncα− 1 < 0,
where c = 2(n−1)µ3
1+σ2
1−σ2L
4. The last inequality above holds,
if
0 < α <
−n+
√
n2 + 4µc
2µ
.
By substituting c in the expression above, we obtain
0 < α <
√
n2 + 2µ
4(1−σ2)
(n−1)L4(1+σ2) − n
2µ
.
